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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to determine a theoretical linkage between tax 
decentralisation and regional growth. For this purpose a two fiscal tiers growth model is 
specified. First, working on Zou (1996) analytical framework, which account for the 
potential effects of intergovernmental policies on regional growth, a tax decentralisation 
process is brought in. Next its original model is expanded taking into account such 
process. It is shown that the effect of tax decentralisation on regional growth depends on 
the existing relationship between private and regional public capital productivities ratio 
and their stocks ratio square root. Finally a hypothesis for the Spanish economy is 
obtained. It will be checked empirically in subsequent work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Studies of the possible relationship between fiscal decentralisation processes and 
economic growth opened up a new line of research in the latter half of the 1990’s. This 
arose out of a much wider tradition concerned with the relationships between fiscal 
decentralisation and a series of economic and political goals, which was founded on the 
seminal work of Tiebout (1956), Stigler (1957), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972). In 
addition to economic growth per se¸ these goals included public spending efficiency, 
horizontal fiscal equity, controlling the government size, macroeconomic stability, 
fostering appropriate conditions in the markets and for government, and poverty 
reduction. 
 
The main spur to the development of this new line of research has been the 
devolution process from central to lower tiers of government, a process that has taken 
place mainly in transitional and developing economies with the encouragement of 
various international bodies, particularly the World Bank. The intuition that these 
processes might not only affect the efficiency of public spending, horizontal fiscal 
equity and macroeconomic stability, comprising what might be called the traditional 
effects, but could also influence economic growth has led researchers at this and other 
international institutions to analyse this possible relationship. 
 
The emergence or re-emergence of debate on the subject of fiscal 
decentralisation in numerous developed economies in recent decades has, meanwhile, 
motivated scholars to take up or continue this line of research. Consequently, the 
process holds a key place in the study of these economies with research focusing on the 
possible relationship with economic growth, one of the basic academic concerns of the 
1990s. 
 
A detailed review of the current state of research into the question of the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth is to be found in 
Martínez-Vázquez and McNab (2003). These scholars draw attention to the paucity of 
empirical work in this area, which contrasts sharply with the profusion of informal 
literature on the economic consequences of fiscal decentralisation. Moreover, they 
argue that a series of problems need to be overcome if we are to arrive at consistent   3
estimates of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth and 
avoid accepting potentially erroneous results. At the same time, they highlight the need 
to develop the theoretical basis for the relationship further by answering the question of 
why we should expect fiscal decentralisation to have any effect on economic growth. 
The aim of this paper is precisely to contribute to this theoretical development. 
 
Let us begin by clarifying the concept of fiscal decentralisation. We mean by 
this expression those processes by which policy is devolved from central to lower tiers 
of government, without specifying whether this refers to spending or revenue raising 
powers. Hence, when we wish to refer explicitly to the transfer of spending, we shall 
use the term “expenditure decentralisation”, and when devolution affects revenues 
either “revenue decentralisation” or “tax decentralisation”. 
 
Martínez-Vázquez and McNab (2003) draw a clear distinction between the 
direct and indirect relationships between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth, 
indicating that it is the latter which may be identified via the traditional effects of fiscal 
decentralisation. In this paper, however, we shall concentrate on the direct relationship, 
which is clearly described in Oates (1993)
1, who transposes the essence of his 
proposition concerning the positive impact of fiscal decentralisation on economic 
efficiency to the dynamic sphere of economic growth, though without formal analysis. 
The economic efficiency proposition was developed within a static framework in Oates’ 
(1972) Decentralisation Theorem and was further reinforced with the population 
mobility arguments put forward by Tiebout (1956). Thus, regional and national 
economic growth could be increased if decisions concerning investment in different 
types of capital were taken at lower tiers of government, because of the greater local 
knowledge existing at these levels. With some exceptions, this argument has been taken 
as the starting point for the empirical and theoretical research undertaken between the 
second half of the 1990s and the present to study the existence of possible fiscal 
decentralisation effects on economic growth. This series of studies includes eminently 
empirical work seeking to quantify the effect, such as Woller and Phillips (1998), Zhang 
and Zou (1998), Lin and Liu (2000), Akai and Sakata (2002), Rodríguez-Pose and 
Bwire (2003), and Thiessen (2003), and papers that not only attempt to quantify the 
                                                           
1 Nevertheless, other scholars of fiscal federalism also describe positive effects on economic growth. See, 
for example, Bahl and Linn (1992), Rivlin (1992), Bird (1993) and Gramlich (1993).   4
effect but also to construct a simple analytical model reflecting the relationship existing 
between the two phenomena. These include papers by Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xie, 
Zou and Davoodi (1999), Zhang and Zou (2001), and Martínez-Vázquez and McNab 
(2002). Finally, there is the work of Zou (1996), Brueckner (1999) and Gong and Zou 
(2002 and 2003), who focus exclusively, and therefore in greater detail, on the 
construction of the analytic framework. 
 
Our aim here is to add to the latter group of papers, which is to say those that 
seek to establish an analytical framework that would describe as fully as possible the 
relationships existing between the phenomena of fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth, and for this reason we shall concentrate on the pioneering work of Zou (1996), 
whose work has been at the forefront in the field. In this paper, the author identify long-
term effects from taxes and transfers on the accumulation of private and public capital 
in a representative region and, therefore, on economic growth. However, we observe 
what we consider to be two significant limitations in Zou’s model.  
 
The first is the partial consideration of central or federal government, which is 
assumed not to invest or spend on its own behalf within the region, but to act simply as 
a tax collector and provider of funding through transfers
2. 
 
The second limitation in Zou (1996) is that it fails specifically to include a 
process for tax decentralisation, on the basis of which we might identify its effects on 
economic growth in the representative region in order to propose any explanatory 
hypothesis. Let us note here, that in modelling the fiscal decentralisation process within 
the framework of endogenous growth models the literature has hitherto concentrated on 
expenditure decentralisation to arrive at growth-maximising expenditure shares among 
different levels of government
3, while disregarding any consideration of the effects of 
tax decentralisation on economic growth. It is this limitation, specifically in Zou (1996) 
and generally in the literature on the subject, that we seek to resolve in this paper. 
 
                                                           
2 Gong and Zou (2003) and Gil (2003) propose expanding the model in order to overcome this limitation. 
 
3 See, inter alia, Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999), and Zhang and Zou (2001).   5
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we briefly present the 
model described in Zou (1996) and explain key results. We then go on to describe how 
tax decentralisation might be included in the model and propose a hypothesis to explain 
the manner in which this process affects growth in the Spanish economy. We end with 
our conclusions and an indication of possible avenues to extend this research. 
 
II.  ZOU’S (1996) MODEL 
 
In 1996, Heng-fu Zou, a World Bank researcher, published Taxes, federal 
grants, local public spending, and growth
4. The paper considers a two-tier structure of 
local and federal government, each with their own income tax, a local consumption tax, 
intergovernmental transfers and balanced budgets. Based on this scenario, Zou 
describes a regional economic growth model for the accumulation of local private and 
public capital, allowing investigation of the manner in which changes in taxes and 
transfers affect the long-term equilibrium values for private consumption and the stock 
of private capital, as well as local public consumption and stock of capital. This analysis 
is based on two different preferences structures for a representative agent, the first 
including local public as well as private consumption as an argument in the utility 
function, and the second considering local public investment as well as public and 
private consumption. The latter structure was originally proposed by Arrow and Kurz 
(1970). The result is a dynamic system that assumes the federal government does not 
invest or consume on its own behalf in the region and therefore comprises four 
differential equations and the four endogenous variables reflecting local private and 
public consumption, and local private and public investment (c, E, kp, ks). 
 
These equations are obtained on the basis of: 
 
1. A utility function for the representative agent (productive family) in the 
representative region defined in accordance with the commonest preferences structure 
                                                           
4 This work was presented as the development and expansion of a previous paper, Dynamic effects of 
federal grants on local spending, published in 1994, which described a very partial dynamic analysis 
focusing on the effects of intergovernmental transfers on local public consumption and investment but 
assuming that tax revenues were constant and ignoring any effects on private sector’s consumption and 
investment.   6
on the basis of private consumption (c) and local public consumption (E)
5 such that 





[ u (c) + v (E)] e
 – ρt dt, with 0 < ρ  <   1       ( 1 )  
 
where ρ is a constant representing the intertemporal discount rate which, in the 
form it appears in the expression, reflects the preference for present as opposed to future 
consumption. 
 
The utility function is increasing, concave and continuosly differentiable, while 
its additive form simplifies the analysis but does not affect key results. 
 
2. A production function for the representative agent, which is defined by two 
inputs, private capital (kp) and local public capital (ks): 
 
y = y ( kp, ks)           ( 2 )  
 
This is also an increasing, concave and continuosly differentiable function, in 
which the two types of capital are complementary. 
 
The production function also satisfies the Inada’s conditions: 
 
1.  yi → ∞ as ki → 0 
2.  yi → 0 as ki → ∞ 
 
where yi is the production function first derivative of ki, with i = p, s. 
 
These conditions guarantee that endogenous growth in the model is due to the 
existence of non decreasing returns on total capital. 
                                                           
5 As we have already explained, the author also considers a preferences structure including local public 
investment (ks) as well as consumption in the utility function. However, he makes clear that this is not the 
most usual structure to be found in the literature and goes on to remark that this specification results in   7
 
In order to simplify subsequent analysis no capital depreciation is considered. 
 
3. A federal government that collects an income tax from the private sector in 
the representative region at the rate τf in each period. Expenditures consist of two types 
of matching grants to the representative local government: a matching grant for local 
public investment (at the rate α, with 0 < α < 1) and a matching grant for local public 
consumption (at the rate β with 0 < β < 1). The budget is balanced, such that: 
τf y = α
.
k s + βE        ( 3 )  
where 
.
k s is local public investment in the representative region for each period. 
 
4. A representative local government that collects an income tax at the rate of τs 
on the private sector and a consumption tax at the rate τc on private consumption. 
Hence, total revenue of a typical local government will consists of these taxes plus the 
transfers received from the federal government, and its total expenditure will consist of 
local public consumption and local public investment. Once again, a balanced budget is 
assumed such that: 
τs y + τc c + α
.
k s + βE = 
.
k s + E         ( 4 )  
 
Based on (3) and (4) Zou arrives at what he terms an integrated budget 
constraint for the local and federal governments, although this could in fact be defined 
simply as a local budget constraint in view of the structure of the model as regards the 
federal government: 
.
k s = (τs + τf) y + τc c – E        ( 5 )  
 
A budget constraint can now be defined for the representative agent, and this is 
given by the condition that the agent’s income after tax is equal to total consumption 
and investment expenditures: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the disappearance of such desirable properties for the equilibrium of the resulting system as unity and 
stability.   8
(1 – τf – τs) y – τc c = 
.




k p is private investment made by the representative agent in the period of 
time considered. 
 
Reordering the terms, Zou obtains: 
.
k p = (1 – τf – τs) y – (1 + τc) c      ( 6 ´ )  
 
In the manner of Barro and Sala-i-Martín (1995), he then goes on to address 
dynamic optimisation by the private agent and the representative local government. 
Both seek to maximise the well-being of the agent, taking into account their respective 
budget constraints, based on the respective control variables (local private and public 
cosumption) and state variables (local private and public investment), thereby obtaining 
the four equations referred to above: 
.
k p = (1 – τf – τs) y – (1 + τc) c      ( 6 ´ )  
.








[(1 – τf – τs) yp – ρ]        ( 7 )  
.






[τs (1 – α)
-1 ys – ρ]        ( 8 )  
 
Finally, Zou proves that the dynamic system, composed of these four equations, 
has a unique perfect foresight equilibrium. 
 
Table 1 summarises the main results obtained by Zou. It reflects the effects of 
changes in the exogenous variables (federal income tax (τf), local income tax (τs), local 
consumption tax (τc), investment matching grants to the representative local government 
(α), and matching grants to the representative local government for public consumption 
(β) on the long-term equilibrium values of the endogenous variables: stock of private 
capital (k p), stock of public capital (k s), private consumption (c) and local public   9
consumption (E ). These effects are studied for the two types of preferences assumed, 
which are private and local public consumption as factors in utility function (A), and 
private consumption, local public consumption and local public investment as 
arguments in utility function (B). 
 
Table 1. Long-term effects of taxes and transfers. Zou (1996) 
 Exogenous  variables 
τf  τs  τc  α  β  Endogenous 
variables  A B A B A B A B A B 
k p  – – ? ? 0 + + + 0 – 
k s  – – ? ? 0 + + + 0 – 
c  – – ? ? – ? + + 0 – 
E   ? ? ? ? + + + + 0 – 
Source: Zou (1996) 
 
Applying Zou’s (1996) model under the commonest preferences structure (A), it 
may thus be affirmed that any increase in federal taxation has negative effects on long-
term capital accumulation and therefore on economic growth; that the effect of an 
increase on the local income tax is indeterminate; that an increase in local public 
investment transfers will stimulate long-term economic growth; and that economic 
growth is not affected by changes in transfers for local public consumption. The 
complementary nature of private and local public capital is a determining factor for 
these results. 
 
This paper is the first to propose a general equilibrium framework to analyse the 
effects of changes in taxation and grants on local economic growth. However, it has 
nothing explicit to say regarding the effects of a fiscal decentralisation process. In 
subsequent research, Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999), and 
Zhang and Zou (2001), also within the framework of endogenous growth, consider the 
possible effects of expenditure decentralisation arriving as we have said at growth-
maximising expenditure shares among different levels of government. These turn out to 
be the ratios of individual productivity over the aggregate productivity of spending by 
different levels of government. Hence, if expenditure allocations do not coincide with 
these ratios, a simple reallocation can lead to higher economic growth without altering   10
the total budget share in GDP
6. The effects of tax decentralisation on growth have yet to 
be investigated, and we shall address this issue in the next section using Zou’s (1996) 
model as the framework. 
 
III.  ZOU’S (1996) MODEL AND TAX DECENTRALISATION 
 
Leaving aside the local consumption tax (τc) for the sake of simplicity, and given 
that the exclusion of this tax does not alter the results we are interested in, our basic aim 
is to incorporate a process of tax decentralisation into the model and identify its effects 
on economic growth in the representative region. This process of tax decentralisation 
may be viewed as a gain for the tax autonomy of the region, insofar as the percentage of 
total local government funding obtained through federal government transfers will 
decline accordingly or, to look at the other side of the coin, because the percentage of 
total funding raised through the local income tax will rise. 
 
In the first place, we need to define a tax decentralisation indicator. Starting 
from the representative local government budget constraint in Zou’s (1996) model: 
τs y + α
.
k s + βE = 
.
k s + E        ( 4 ´ )  
 
Dividing both terms by total expenditure (
.
k s + E) and reordering the expression, 
we may obtain an indicator of the proportion of total local expenditure funded by own 
taxes (τs y): 
τs y / (
.
k s + E) = 1 – (α
.
k s + βE) / (
.
k s + E)       ( 9 )  
 
Let us call this indicator Φ. 
 
If we consider that equal percentages are transferred for local public 
consumption and investment (α = β), the tax decentralisation indicator would be 
reduced to the expression: 
                                                           
6This result was obtained using CES and Cobb-Douglas technologies. 
   11
τs y / (
.
k s + E) = 1 – α         ( 9 ´ )  
 
which is to say, 
 
Φ = 1 – α          ( 9 ´ ´ )  
 
Hence, if we wish to study the effects of a tax decentralisation process on Zou 
(1996), we need to consider a reduction in transfers from federal to local government 
(α). As a consequence, the federal government will reduce its tax rate (τf), assuming 
same level of income, because of the fall in the cost of transfers. If the local government 
wishes for its part to maintain its level of expenditure, it will need to respond with an 
increase in the tax rate (τs) to offset the decline in the funds transferred.  
 
On the other hand, empirical studies described in a large literature following 
Gramlich (1977) suggest that in general one monetary unit received in the form of 
transfers results in an increase in regional public expenditure that is greater than the 
increase generated in such expenditure by an increase of one monetary unit in regional 
income due to a federal tax cut. This phenomenon has been labelled as the flypaper 
effect because, according to the studies cited, money tends to “stick” in the first sector 
(public or private) where it “lands”
7. 
 
In order to consider the flypaper effect in the model, let us denote τ to be total 
income tax rate when local public expenditure is financed exclusively through transfers. 
So, we have: 
 
τf = τ           ( 1 0 )  
 
If local public expenditure is financed exclusively through local taxes we have, 
in turn: 
 
τs = τ (1 − ε),  0 ≤ ε ≤  1         ( 1 1 )  
 
                                                           
7 Explanation of the flypaper effect is highly debated: see Bailey (1999), chapter 11.   12
where ε would be an indicator of the intensity of the flypaper effect. So, for a 
level of tax decentralization, Φ, we have: 
 
τf = α τ [1 − ε (1 − α) ]          ( 1 2 )  
 
τs = (1 − α) τ [1 − ε (1 − α) ]         ( 1 3 )  
 
τf + τs = τ [1 − ε (1 − α) ]         ( 1 4 )  
 
Incorporating the definition of a tax decentralisation indicator and the existence 
of the flypaper effect and excluding the local consumption tax, Zou’s (1996) model 




[ u (c) + v (E)] e
 – ρt dt, with 0 < ρ  <   1       ( 1 )  
y = y ( kp, ks)           ( 2 )  
τf y = α (
.
k s + E)          ( 3 ´ )  
τs y = (1 - α) (
.
k s + E)          ( 4 ´ ´ )  
 
Hence, the regional government and individual constraints are: 
.
k s = τ [1 − ε (1 − α)] y – E        ( 5 ´ )  
.
k p = [1 – τ [1 − ε (1 − α)]] y – c       ( 6 ´ ´ )  
 
Dynamic optimisation by the private agent and the representative local 
government is thus described by the following system of equations: 
.
k p = [1 – τ [1 − ε (1 − α)]] y – c       ( 6 ´ ´ )  
.







− [[1 – τ [1 − ε (1 − α)]] yp – ρ]      ( 7 ´ )    13
.






[ τ [1 − ε (1 − α)] ys – ρ]      ( 8 ´ )  
 
It is clear that this system has a single equilibrium and following Buiter (1984), 
as Zou (1996) does, it can be shown that this equilibrium is stable. 
 
Let us now go on to examine the equilibrium at the two extremes of tax 
decentralisation: there is no tax decentralisation (i.e. all local government funds are 
obtained through transfers), and complete tax decentralisation (i.e. all local government 
funds are obtained from local income tax). In order to compare the two scenarios and 
determine the effects of the tax decentralisation process on regional economic growth, 
we shall consider the Cobb-Douglas production technology. The result obtained is then 
generalized for any change in the level of tax decentralisation without the need to 
consider extreme situations. 
 
A) Null tax decentralisation, Φ = 0 
 




k p = (1 – τ) y – c         ( 1 5 )  
.
















[τ ys – ρ]        ( 1 8 )  
 
with the following in the equilibrium: 
 
(1 – τ) y (k p, k s) –c  =   0         ( 1 9 )  
τ y (k p, k s) – E =   0          ( 2 0 )    14
(1 – τ) yp (k p, k s) – ρ  =   0         ( 2 1 )  
τ ys (k p, k s) – ρ  =   0          ( 2 2 )  
 
where  k p,  k s  c and E  denote steady state variable values and the exogenous 
variables are τ and ρ.  
 
Considering that the production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form such that 
 
y = A kp
γ ks
η          ( 2 3 )  
 
where 0 < γ < 1, 0 < η < 1, and γ + η = 1 
 
the equilibrium (19) – (22) is as follows: 
 











 s – E   =   0        ( 2 0 ´ )  
(1 – τ) γ y / k p – ρ  =   0        ( 2 1 ´ )  
τ η y / k s – ρ  =   0          ( 2 2 ´ )  
 
Working out k  p and k  s from (21´) and (22´), we obtain: 
 
k p = (1 – τ) γ y / ρ           ( 2 1 ´ ´ )  
k s = τ η y / ρ          ( 2 2 ´ ´ )  
 
B) Full tax decentralisation, Φ = 1 
 
In this case, the system formed by equations (6´´), (5´) (7´) and (8´) is as 
follows: 
.
k p = [1 – τ (1 − ε)] y – c        ( 2 4 )  
.
















[[τ (1 − ε)] ys – ρ]       ( 2 7 )  
 
with the following in the equilibrium: 
 
[1 – τ (1 − ε)] y (k p, k s) – c  =  0       (28) 
[τ (1 − ε)] y (k s + E ) – E   =  0       (29) 
[1 – τ (1 − ε)] yp (k p, k s) – ρ  =  0       (30) 
[τ (1 − ε)] ys (k p, k s) – ρ  =  0        (31) 
 
where  k p,  k s  c and E  denote steady state values and the exogenous variables 
are τ, ε and ρ.  
 
Since the production function takes the specific Cobb-Douglas form reflected in 
(23), the equilibrium (28) – (31) is as follows: 
 




s – c  =  0       (28´) 




s – E   =  0       (29´) 
[1 – τ (1 − ε)] γ y ⁄k p – ρ  =   0         ( 3 0 ´ )  
[τ (1 − ε)] η y ⁄k s – ρ  =   0         ( 3 1 ´ )  
 
Working out k p and k s from (30´) and (31´), we obtain: 
 
k p = [1 – τ (1 − ε)] γ y ⁄ ρ        ( 3 0 ´ ´ )  
k s = [τ (1 − ε)] η y ⁄ ρ         ( 3 1 ´ ´ )  
 
C) Comparison of the scenarios 
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Given Zou’s (1996) model, the results we have obtained for the equilibrium 
values of the two types of capital for a Cobb Douglas technology considering the two 
extremes of tax decentralisation are as follows: 
 
Φ = 0          Φ = 1 
 
k pN = (1 – τ) γ y / ρ      k pF = [1 – τ (1 − ε)] γ y / ρ  
 
k sN = τ η y / ρ       k sF = [τ (1 − ε)] η y / ρ 
 
It may be observed that the stocks of equilibrium for the two types of capital 
(k p,  k s) are different. Specifically, if we move from a situation of null tax 
decentralisation (Φ = 0) to full tax decentralisation (Φ = 1), the long-term equilibrium 
values for private and local public capital undergo the following changes: 
 








dy kp = (γ y / kp) dkp = (γ y)
2 τ ε / kp ρ 
 
dy ks = (η y / ks) dks = – (η y)
2 τ ε / ks ρ 
 
Considering both expressions together, we obtain: 
 
dy = [ y
2 τ ε / ρ] [(γ
2 / kp) – (η
2 / ks)   ]        ( 3 3 )  
   17
Since the first of the expressions in square brackets in this equation is positive, 
we may conclude that in Zou’s (1996) model a tax decentralisation process represented 
by the switch from Φ = 0 to Φ = 1 would generate economic growth provided that: 
 
[(γ
2 / kp) – (η
2 / ks) ] > 0 
 
or that  
 





         ( 3 4 )  
 
D) Generalization of the result 
 
Let us now assume that our starting point is a given level of tax decentralisation 
measured by Φ1 = 1 – α1 and we wish to reach a level of Φ2 = 1 – α2, such that Φ1 < Φ2 
or α1 > α2, which is the same thing. Proceeding in the same manner as for the extreme 
scenarios, we may obtain the expression: 
 
dy = [ y
2 τ ε (α1 – α2) / ρ] [(γ
2 / kp) – (η
2 / ks)  ]     (35) 
 
where the magnitude of the first term in square brackets, which remains positive, 
depends on the intensity of the process of tax decentralisation. This magnitude will 
reach its maximum for the greatest possible progress, which is reflected in the case of 
the switch from null tax decentralisation (Φ1 = 0 or α1 = 1) to total tax decentralisation 
(Φ2 = 1 or α2 = 0) considered above, from which we have obtained expression (33). 
 
The term in the second set of square brackets remains the same as in (34), which 
confirms the idea that a process of tax decentralisation would generate long-term 
economic growth if the private and regional public capital productivities ratio exceeds 
the radicand of the coefficient between the stock of private capital and the stock of local 
public capital. 
 
Let us turn now to study the case of the Spanish economy on the basis of data 
obtained from Fundación Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (FBBVA) and Instituto   18
Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) for the stock of non residential 
private capital and the stock of public capital (used to approximate the stock of local 
public capital, because this is the only type of public capital existing in the structure of 
the model since central government does not make any investments of its own in the 
region) and Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) data for the remaining variables. 
This provides average values for the stock of non residential private capital per head 
and the stock of public capital per head over the period 1971 – 1997. Let us now 
perform simple estimations of the productivity of these types of capital for the period in 
accordance with the specification of the production function, as a result of which we 
obtain the following results (base year 1986)
8: 
 
kp = €12,537    ks = €2,386    γ = 0.79    η = 0.21 
 
Hence, per (34) we have 
 





 = 2.29 
 
Hence, our hypothesis based on the model proposed in this paper is that going 
deeply into the process of tax decentralisation in the Spanish economy would produce 
long-term growth. Our next objective is to verify this hypothesis empirically. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Taking as our starting point the analysis of Zou (1996), one of the leading 
scholars to study the existence of a direct relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and economic growth, we have identified two limitations in the model, which we have 
sought to resolve in order to contribute to the examination of the relationship. Having 
addressed the first of these limitations in an earlier paper, this paper concentrates on the 
need to incorporate a tax decentralisation process and examine its effects on economic 
growth in a representative region. By including this process in Zou’s (1996) model, we 
have been able to define a relationship that determines the effect of tax decentralisation 
on regional economic growth. We have evaluated this relationship for the Spanish 
                                                           
8 We acknowledge Jaime Sanaú Villarroya for providing these estimations.   19
economy as a whole, as a result of which we have arrived at a hypothesis in line with 
our proposal that progress in tax decentralisation does in fact contribute to long-term 
growth in the Spanish economy.  
 
After modelling not only expenditure decentralisation (Davoodi and Zou (1998), 
Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999), and Zhang and Zou (2001)) but also tax decentralisation, 
one possible avenue for the expansion of this research with regard to the further 
development of the theoretical basis for the relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and economic growth would be to combine both phenomena in a single model. From an 
empirical standpoint, further research will required to verify our hypothesis in relation 
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